
Defensive Finite State Automata




POWER ATTACKS

- Seattle, 1999.
- US and French delegates negotiate under which conditions beef could be imported to France.
- «The Sun » sends a journalist to investigate:



SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS Measure the circuit's processing time and current consumption to infer what happens inside it.



Logistics vs. Strategy

- How to get countermeasures? Logistics
- Where to use these countermeasures? Strategy

Here we address strategy.

The Subleq Machine

Subleq is a Turing-complete machine having only one instruction.

subleq a b c

② if the result is negative or zero, go to c else execute the next instruction.

The Subleq Machine

- Since subleq has only three arguments and since there is no confusion of instructions possible (there is only one!), a subleq code can be regarded as a sequence of triples.
- a₁
 b₁
 c₁
 a₂
 b₂
 c₂
 a₃
 b₃
 c₃

... interleaved with data

Since data can be embedded in the code, the sequence of triples can be interleaved with data. For instance:

```
a_1 b_1 c_1
data_1 data_2
a_2 b_2 c_2
data_3
a_3 b_3 c_3
```

How does it work?

*b = *b-*a;

```
if (*b≤0)

program_counter = c;

else

program_counter = program_counter+3;
```

Genealogy

Subleq is an OISC ("One Instruction Set Computer) which comes from the Minsky machine concept.

The Minsky machine is a register machine with only two instructions: "increment" and "decrement-andbranch".

Allowing for comfort

Memory is loaded with instructions and data altogether (no distinction).

Hence the code can potentially self-modify and consider that any cell is a, b or c.

We can pre-store constants (like 0,1 etc)

e.g. we devote a cell called Z to contain zero, N to contain -1

subleq Z Z C

JMP c

subleq Z Z C

subleq a a \$+1

CLR a

subleq a a \$+1

- CLR b
- subleq a Z \$+1
- subleq Z b \$+1
- CLR Z

MOV a b

- subleq b b \$+1
- subleq a Z +1 Z=-*a
- subleq Z b \$+1
- subleq Z Z \$+1

*b=0

*b=0-(-*a)=*a

Z=0

- subleq a Z \$+1
- subleq b Z \$+1
- CLR C
- subleq Z c \$+1
- CLR Z

ADDabc

- subleq a Z \$+1
 subleq b Z \$+1
 subleq c c \$+1
 subleq Z c \$+1
 subleq Z z \$+1
- Z=0-*a
- Z=-*a-*b
- *c=*c-*c=0
- *c=0+*a+*b

Z=0

- CLR t
- CLR s
- subleq a t \$+1
- subleq b s \$+1
- subleq s t \$+1
- CLR C
- CLR s
- subleq t s \$+1
- subleq s c \$+1

SUB a b c

subleq	t	t	\$+1	*t=0
subleq	S	S	\$+1	*s=0
subleq	a	t	\$+1	*t=-*a
subleq	b	S	\$+1	s=-*b
subleq	S	t	\$+1	t=-*a+*b
subleq	C	C	\$+1	*c=0
subleq	S	S	\$+1	*s=0
subleq	t	S	\$+1	*s=0-(-*a+*b)=*a-*b
subleq	S	C	\$+1	*c=0-(*a-*b)=*b-*a

not really optimal code just to illustrate

- CLR t subleq a t \$+1 CLR s
- subleq t s \$+1
- subleq b s c

BLEabc

- subleq t t \$+1t=0subleq a t \$+1*t=-*asubleq s s \$+1*s=0subleq t s \$+1*s=*asubleq t s \$+1*s=*a
 - if *a-*b≤0 goto c

- CLR t subleq a t \$+1 CLR s subleq b s \$+1 subleq s t \$+1
- subleq N t c

BHIabc

- subleq t t \$+1
- subleq a t \$+1
- subleq s s \$+1 *s=0
- subleq b s \$+1
- subleq s t \$+1
- subleq N t c

- *t=0
 - *t=-*a
- *s=-*b
 - *t=-*a+*b
 - t = -*a + b (-1)
 - if *b-*a+1≤0 goto c

What have we got so far?

- JMP a
- MOV a b
- SUB a b c
- ADD a b c
- BHI a b c

BLE a b c

CLR a

goto a *b=*a *c=*b-*a *c=*b+*a ∕∕if *b-*a+1≤0 goto c }if *b<*b+1≤*a goto c ŷif *b<*a goto c</pre> if *a>*b goto c f *a-*b≤0 goto c
if *a≤*b goto c


*a=0

- MOV b v
- MOV a w
- CLR C
- subleq N c \$+1
- subleq w v \$+4
- subleq Z Z \$-8

- MOV b v *v=*b
- MOV a w *w=*a
- CLR C
- subleq N c \$+1
- subleq w v \$+4
- subleq Z Z \$-8

- *c=0
- *c = *c (-1)

MOV	b	\mathbf{v}		*v=*b
MOV	a	W		*w=*a
CLR	C			*c=0
subleq	N	C	\$+1	*C++
subleq	W	V	\$+4	*v=*v-*w if(*v≤0)
subleq	Z	Z	\$-8	else



*v=*b *w=*a *c=0 →*c++ *v=*v-*w if(*v≤0) else

DIVabc

*v=*b *c=0 *c++ *v=*v-*a if(*v≤0) else

DIVabc

*v=*b *c=0 *c++ *v=*v-*a if(*v≤0) else

DIVabc

a = 5; b = 45; c = 0; Label[more]; c++; b = b - a; If[b ≤ 0, Goto[finish], Goto[more]]; Label[finish]; Print[c];

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*v=*b *c=0 →*c++ *v=*v-*a if(*v≤0) else

for nonzero arguments (else need one more test)

- CLR u;v;w
- MOV b v
- subleq N w \$+1
- subleq u u \$+1
- subleq a u \$+1
- CLR C
- subleq u c \$+1
- subleq w v \$+4
- subleq Z Z \$-8

- CLR u;v;w
- MOV b v
- subleq N w \$+1
- subleq u u \$+1
- subleq a u \$+1
- CLR C
- subleq u c \$+1
- subleq w v \$+4
- subleq Z Z \$-8

*u=*v=*w=0
*v=*b
*w=0-(-1)=1
*u=0
*u=-*a
*c=0

*v=*b *w=0-(-1)=1

*u=-*a *c=0

subleq u c \$+1
subleq w v \$+4
subleq Z Z \$-8

*v=*b *w=1

*u=-*a *c=0

*v=*b *w=1

*v=*b *w=1 *u=-*a *c=0 *c=*c+*a *v--; if(*v≤0)—

*v=*b *w=1


*u=-*a
*c=0
subleq u c \$+1
subleq w v \$+4
subleq Z Z \$-8
*c=*c+*a
*v--; if(*v
$$\leq 0$$
)-

*v=*b *w=1

subleq u c
$$+1$$

subleq w v $+4$
subleq Z Z -8
else

MULabc




MULabc

MULabc


h[110]:= a = 3; b = 4; c = 0; Label[more]; c += a; b--;
If[b ≤ 0, Goto[finish], Goto[more]]; Label[finish];
Print[c];

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- MOV a L1
- data Z
- data Z
- L1: data Z

BRX a




a very powerful instruction

subleq b Z L1

subleq Z Z L2

- L1 subleq Z Z \$+1
 - subleq Z b c
- L2 subleq Z Z \$+1

BEQ b c



What else do we need?

Boolean operations such as AND, XOR.

Assuming that we have AND, we can design the XOR:

$$\mathbf{A} + \mathbf{B} = \sum_{i=0}^{7} 2^{i} (\mathbf{B}_{i} + \mathbf{A}_{i}) = \sum_{i=0}^{7} 2^{i} (\mathbf{B}_{i} \oplus \mathbf{A}_{i}) + \sum_{i=0}^{7} 2^{i+1} \mathbf{B}_{i} \mathbf{A}_{i} = \mathbf{A} \oplus \mathbf{B} + 2(\mathbf{A} \wedge \mathbf{B})$$

Where is all this going?

The machine can do everything a smartcard can do.

Still, it's execution is hyper-regular.

Eliminates instruction-dependent leakage. Only leakage is data-dependent.

Where is all this going?

A "reductionist" approach.

Push all security issues into the subleq machine.


If the subleq machine is side-channel resistant then no matter what algorithm we implement on it, the implementation is side-channel resistant!


Where is all this going?


But any algorithm can be coded on the machine.


Hence it suffices to concentrate all effort on protecting the machine.


But the machine is very simple, hence (conceivably!) much easier to secure than an AES or RSA coprocessor.











What Have We Done?

Implemented the machine in FPGA (600 CLBs), wrote a compiler.

Circa 7 subleqs per 8-bit assembler instruction. But the machine is so simple that clock can be very fast.

Explored variants: SUBXORLEQ, SUBLEQXOR, SUBANDLEQ, etc.

Paper underway (soon on ePrint).